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This paper presents the results of a pilot-in-the-loop experiment performed to investigate the efficacy of a pilot-
induced oscillation (PIO) or adverse rotorcraft-pilot coupling (RPC) real-time detection method, to be implemented 
as an in-cockpit warning system. A test pilot performed a number of simulated flights inside the Heliflight-R simulator 
at the University of Liverpool. Two handling qualities (HQ) mission task element (MTE) maneuvers were chosen, 
namely Precision Hover and Lateral Reposition. The baseline dynamics were those of a FLIGHTLAB BO105-like 
helicopter model, as used in previous tests; changes in rate limits were introduced to induce the pilot-vehicle system 
(PVS) to be more RPC/PIO prone, and to observe pilot’s adaptation to these variations causing system instabilities 
during the chosen MTEs. To objectively measure the severity of the PIO encountered during the tests, the Phase-
Aggression Criterion (PAC) has been used. This method has been developed to allow for real-time PIO detection in 
order to provide the information inside the cockpit. In addition, pilot subjective ratings were collected, by using the 
HQs, PIO and Pilot Workload rating scales. Overall, the results show a good correlation between objective and 
subjective evaluations, and that it is possible to detect PIOs in real-time. The information can be provided to the pilot 
by means of visual, aural or haptic cues, which is the work the authors are currently carrying out.  
 
NOTATION  
𝐴"  Aggression, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 𝑠' 
𝐻) Control Gearing, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 𝑠 𝑖𝑛 
𝑝 Roll rate, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 𝑠 
𝑞 Pitch rate, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 𝑠 
𝑇/012  Time of last control peak, 𝑠 
𝑇/013  Time of current control peak, 𝑠 
𝑇4012  Time of last pitch rate peak, 𝑠 
𝑇4013  Time of current pitch rate peak, 𝑠 
𝑇5012  Time of last roll rate peak, 𝑠 
𝑇5013  Time of current roll rate peak, 𝑠 
𝛷 Phase delay, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 
𝛿829 Lateral cyclic control, 𝑖𝑛 
𝛿82: Longitudinal cyclic control, 𝑖𝑛 
𝜃<= Lateral swashplate deflection, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 
𝜃<) Longitudinal swashplate deflection, 𝑑𝑒𝑔 
INTRODUCTION 1  
Rotorcraft-Pilot Couplings (RPCs) are defined as undesirable 
phenomena originating from an anomalous interaction 
between pilot and rotorcraft [1–3]. The term RPC includes 
any kind of unfavorable event related to involuntary unstable 
rotorcraft responses resulting from pilot control actions within 
the control loop, whether they are active or passive, 
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oscillatory or non-oscillatory. The most common or well-
known form of RPC is a Pilot-Induced Oscillation (PIO). The 
term PIO refers specifically to an oscillatory aircraft response, 
characterized by an ‘active’ pilot trying to control the vehicle 
within the control loop, which inadvertently excites self-
sustained and potentially divergent vehicle oscillations. 
This work, carried out within the NITROS2 Project, 
aims to develop and evaluate a toolset able to detect PIOs in 
(near) real-time in modern rotorcraft, as well as alleviating 
the unwanted event if it occurs. In this paper, the first of these 
aspects, i.e. detection, is studied by inspection of flight 
simulation data available at the University of Liverpool. The 
intent initially is to use this information to design an alert 
system, which will be used to provide the pilot with visual 
cues to enable him/her to suppress a PIO as it starts 
developing (i.e. a form of manual alleviation). 
Previous work at the University of Liverpool 
focused on a means to identify PIO events offline, after they 
had occurred. This led to the development of the Phase-
Aggression Criterion (PAC) [4, 5]. For this investigation, 
PAC has been developed further to support near real-time data 
acquisition and PIO detection. The detection is ‘near’ to real 
time as a number of data samples have to be taken to perform 
the detection. The detection therefore lags real-time by the 
sampling period. 
One of the first tools developed to detect PIOs in 
real-time is the Real-time Oscillation Verifier (ROVER) [6–
2 NITROS: NITROS: Network for Innovative Training 




8]. This study makes use of ROVER, as a comparator to the 
real-time PAC method.  
This paper is structured as follows. In the next 
Section PAC is briefly described in its post-processing 
detection form, along with the associated PAC chart and PIO 
severity regions. Next, the real-time detection version of PAC 
is presented, and comparisons between the ROVER and PAC 
detection methods are presented. The experimental setup and 
procedure (MTEs, experimental conditions, warning system) 
used in the paper is then described. The results of these 
experiments are shown in terms of subjective and objective 
evaluations. Finally, the paper ends with a brief Discussion 
and some Conclusions.   
METHOD 
This Section presents PAC as a post-processing detection 
method and the usefulness of its associated detection 
boundaries. 
Background 
PAC was designed at the University of Liverpool, 
during the EC-FP7 program ARISTOTEL3 as a post-
processing tool (hereafter, PP-PAC) to objectively verify the 
presence of PIOs during piloted simulation test campaigns. 
Being aware of the importance of pilot opinion, the simulation 
results in Ref. [5] were supported by pilot subjective ratings 
collected using two rating scales: the PIO Tendency Rating 
Scale (PIOR) defined in Refs. [9–11] and the Adverse Pilot 
Couplings Scale (APCS) [4]. The latter was developed in 
response to the perceived deficiencies of the former, such as 
descriptor inconsistencies, and providing little information 
about the severity of the PIO itself. 
A key element of the PAC method is the PAC Chart 
(Figure 1). The PAC chart consists of three regions which 
distinguish between the different PIO severities based upon 
Phase Delay and pilot Aggression. For a more complete 
treatment of the PAC algorithm and severity regions, the 
reader is referred to Ref. [4].  
Offline Detection Method PP-PAC 
The PAC method drew its inspiration from Pilot-
Inceptor Workload (PIW) theory [12, 13]. PIW focuses on the 
pilot input through the use of the Duty Cycle (measure of pilot 
activity) and the Aggression (𝐴"  measure of magnitude and 
rate of control inputs). PAC extended PIW theory by taking 
into account information regarding the vehicle dynamics and 
output, i.e. the Phase Delay (𝛷 between pilot input and 
aircraft output), in order to observe PIOs that occurred during 
the flight. 𝐴"  is a measure of the pilot control activity, i.e. how 
intensively the pilot is working to achieve the task. The faster 
and/or larger the control input, the higher the 𝐴" . The 𝛷 
indicates the phase delay between pilot input and aircraft 
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response (e.g. 𝛷 = 90	𝑑𝑒𝑔 means aircraft response out of 
phase with respect to the pilot input). 
 
 
Figure 1. PAC Chart example showing the PIO 
severity boundaries (Green = No PIO, Yellow = 
Moderate PIO, Red = Severe PIO), data points with 
rounded time stamp and interpolation 
Figure 2 shows an example of a time-history, which portrays 
pilot input in black and rotorcraft angular rate in red for the 
longitudinal axis. These are used for the calculation of the 
PAC parameters 𝛷 and 𝐴" . These two terms are expressed, 












;                      (2) 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of the section of a time history for the 
PAC calculations 
where 𝑇4012 , 𝑇4013  and 𝑇/013  represent the time at the 
beginning of the current oscillation cycle (first rate peak 
detected during the cycle), the time at the end of the current 
𝛿8012  



















oscillation cycle (second rate peak detected) and the time of 
the input peak detected during the cycle respectively. The 𝐻) 
term, for PP-PAC, represents the average control gearing, i.e. 
the ratio of rotorcraft output (rotational rate) to pilot control 
input over the entire response. This term was introduced to 
allow PAC to be applied to different rotorcraft. In the PAC 
definition work, a rotorcraft model based upon the BO105, 
which has a rate command (RC) response type, was used. The 
units of 𝐴"  are, in this case, therefore, deg/s
2. 
Real-time Detection Method 
The large amount of useful data that was collected during the 
ARISTOTEL test campaigns, has been inspected to develop 
a real-time detection and alerting system using the Phase-
Aggression Criterion (RT-PAC). Therefore, PAC has been 
implemented within the Heliflight-R simulation facility [14] 
in order to provide real-time warnings to the pilot. The 
primary focus of the NITROS test campaign described in this 
paper is indeed to develop and evaluate a toolset able to detect 
RPC/PIOs in (near) real-time in modern rotorcraft, as well as 
facilitating the pilot in alleviating the unwanted event if it 
occurs. In this Subsection, the importance of the control 
gearing term is highlighted, the real-time version of PAC 
(RT-PAC) is described with a case study using flight 
simulation data, and the idea behind the warning system is 
presented.  
CONTROL GEARING  
The control gearing, 𝐻), plays a crucial role, because it is the 
term that most influences the magnitude of 𝐴" . In PP-PAC, 
𝐻) was calculated as the mean value of the ratio between 
output and input for the whole manoeuvre of interest. This is 
acceptable for the post-processing analysis, for which it was 
originally intended, but it is not useful for the calculation of 
𝐴"  in real-time. To remedy this, a steady state value of 𝐻) has 
been used for RT-PAC. It is calculated to be the ratio between 
the steady-state values of rotorcraft rates and pilot cyclic 
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CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate how RT-PAC performs in comparison to 
PP-PAC, the following case study is considered. The data 
comes from flight simulation data, where the ADS-33 
Precision Hover maneuver was performed using a BO105-
‘like’ nonlinear model [4]. Time delays and rate limits were 
added to the helicopter control system in the longitudinal and 
lateral axes to trigger PIOs. Figure 3(a) shows the time-
history of pilot control input (black line) and rotorcraft rate 
response (grey dashed line), in the longitudinal axis only, of a 
case in which PIOs were encountered during the tests. 
Clearly, sustained oscillations occurred during this run, 
between approximately t = 18 and 38 seconds and then again 
between t = 63 and 87 seconds. To assess whether there are 
significant differences between the outputs of the methods, 
the case study data have also been used to perform a 
comparison between ROVER, PP-PAC and RT-PAC. Figures 
3(b), (c) and (d) show the ROVER, PP-PAC and RT-PAC 
scores respectively, representative of the PIO detection and 
severity. For the PAC analysis, a score of 1 represents a 
moderate PIO and a score of 2 a severe PIO. All methods 
detect PIOs in approximately the same time intervals, i.e. 
between t = 18 and 38 seconds, t = 63 and 72 seconds and t = 
85 and 87 seconds. These results are quite encouraging. Each 
method gives reasonably similar detection percentages, and 
do so in a correlated way along the time history. 
Figure 4 shows the corresponding RT-PAC chart. As 
previously mentioned, due to the different 𝐻) used, in the y-
axis, the aggression values are the same in character but 
somewhat different in the detail in the RT-PAC chart than in 
the PP-PAC one (not shown here). 




Figure 4. Real-time PAC chart 
 
WARNING SYSTEM  
The intent is to use a warning system to provide the pilot with 
a set of cues to enable him/her to suppress a PIO either before 
or as it happens (i.e. a form of manual alleviation). As a start 
point for this research, a traffic light-style head-up display 
symbol set was developed to advise the pilot by means of 
visual cues as soon as a PIO is detected by the algorithm in 
use. The display is situated in the visual field in such a way 
that it does not interfere with the pilot’s ability to perform the 
primary task. For a NO PIO situation, the display indicates no 
color. When moderate and severe PIOs are detected, the 
display indicates yellow and red respectively. The expectation 
is that the display will indicate to the pilot that a PIO is in 
progress such that a control strategy can be adopted to 
suppress it. Given that PIOs usually happen during tasks 
which require a high pilot control gain, one solution might be 
for the pilot to ‘reduce his/her gain’, but, for the present paper, 
the choice of alleviation strategy is left to the pilot. Further 
details about the warning system can be found in the next 
Section, in the dedicated Display Subsection. 
TEST CAMPAIGN AND EXPERIMENTAL 
SET-UP 
The following Section discusses the test campaign 
that took place in the Heliflight-R (see Figure 5) simulator at 
the University of Liverpool, and the experimental set-up in 
further detail. 
The test campaign was conducted using a single 
former test pilot, with experience in providing subjective 
opinion ratings and overall assessment of vehicle handling 
qualities. The test pilot had also participated in some of the 
ARISTOTEL test campaigns and was therefore familiar with 
the processes involved. He also had had extensive experience 
in using the Heliflight-R simulator. The baseline rotorcraft 




Figure 5. Heliflight-R, University of Liverpool 
Mission Task Elements 
In the ARISTOTEL test campaigns, some insight was 
obtained with respect to maneuver suitability to promote 
RPCs when necessary. This included considerations for the 
overall task suitability in relation to the simulation device 
used. For instance, in the Heliflight-R, low speed maneuvers 
showed high potential to expose RPCs. Based on experience 
from the ARISTOTEL test campaigns, two maneuvers have 
been selected for further investigation: Precision Hover (PH) 
and Lateral Reposition (LR). The maneuver descriptions are 
reported in Table 1. 
Table 1. Mission Task Elements 





Test RT-PAC detection in 
the longitudinal and lateral 
axes, for Cat. I and Cat. II 
PIOs. PIO incipience 






Test the RT-PAC detection 
mainly in the lateral axis, 
for Cat. I and Cat. II PIOs. 
Detection kept active also in 
the longitudinal axis. 
 
The Precision Hover and Lateral Reposition MTEs will be 




The Precision Hover maneuver is initiated with the aircraft 
travelling at a ground speed of between 6 and 10 knots, at an 
altitude of less than 20 feet.  The target hover point is to be 
oriented at 45° relative to the heading of the rotorcraft.  The 
ground track should be such that the rotorcraft will arrive over 
the target hover point.  The hover should be captured in one 
smooth maneuver following the initiation of deceleration – it 
is not acceptable to accomplish most of the deceleration well 
before the hover point and then to “creep up” to the final 
position. Figure 6 and Table 2 show the test course and the 
performance standards for this MTE. 
 
 
Figure 6. Top View and Side View of the Precision 
Hover MTE 
Table 2. Precision Hover Performance Requirements 
Performance Desired Adequate 
Attain stabilized hover within X 
seconds of initiation of 
deceleration 
5 8 
Maintain a stabilized hover for 
at least X seconds 
30 30 
Maintain the longitudinal and 
lateral position within ±X feet 
on the ground 
3 6 
Maintain altitude within ±X feet 2 4 
Maintain heading within ±X ° 5 10 
 
LATERAL REPOSITION 
The lateral reposition is a MTE for assessing the lateral HQs 
of a rotorcraft and is a high aggression maneuver. The task is 
to accelerate the rotorcraft to a certain target airspeed that 
allows the lateral reposition to be completed within 18 
seconds. The second phase requires deceleration back to a 
stabilized hover at the marked end point (450 ft from the 
start). Figure 7 shows the test course schematic.  
 
Figure 7. Top View of the Lateral Reposition MTE 
Table 3 shows the performance standards for this MTE. 
 
Table 3. Lateral Reposition Performance 
Requirements 
Performance Desired Adequate 
Maintain altitude within ±X feet 10 15 
Maintain longitudinal track 
within ±X feet 
10 20 
Maintain heading within ±X ° 10 15 





The majority of maneuvers conducted within the 
ARISTOTEL test campaigns were performed using time 
delays and rate limits specifically designed to make the 
system prone to pilot-vehicle instability. Tests conducted with 
rate limits were found to be more successful within Heliflight-
R, causing severe RPCs during Precision Hover, Roll Step, 
Pitch Tracking and Acceleration-Deceleration manoeuvres. 
For this reason, different values of rate limiters have been 
applied to “trigger PIOs” during the test campaign reported in 
this paper. Table 4 shows the selection of the experimental 
conditions. Indeed, in this experiment different settings of 
lateral and longitudinal rate limits were chosen and tested. It 
would be expected that these variations, with respect to the 
baseline configuration C0, will result in more degraded 
control characteristics possibly causing undesirable and 
unintentional vehicle responses, resulting in sustained severe 









C0 - - 
C1 2.5 - 
C2 3.6 3.6 
C3 2.5 5 
C4 2.5 2.5 
C5 1.8 3.6 
C6 1.8 1.8 
C7 1.25 2.5 
 
Display   
As mentioned in the previous Section, a display was provided 
to the pilot, showing information about the severity of any 
PIO detected in near real-time. 
 
Figure 8. Traffic light Display, for lateral and 
longitudinal PIO detection 
The head-up display is composed of a set of two traffic light 
displays, one representing the PIO detection in the lateral 
(roll) axis and one representing the PIO detection in the 
longitudinal (pitch) axis. Figure 8 illustrates three different 
hypothetical cases of the same display. The case on the left 
side represents a “NO PIO” situation in both axes, the case in 
the middle represents a situation in which a moderate PIO and 
a severe PIO have been detected in the lateral and longitudinal 
axis respectively, the case on the right side represents a 
situation in which a severe PIO has been detected in both axes. 
When either of the displays indicates ‘yellow’, it means that 
the pilot has entered a moderate PIO situation. This is a first 
stage of the alert process, meaning that, by not changing 
strategy (e.g. keeping high the control activity), the pilot may 
enter severe PIO situations, leading to even more critical 
scenarios, indicated by the display turning ‘red’. Furthermore, 
to aid pilot attention getting qualities of the display, the 
arrows (indicating the axis where the PIO is occurring) are 
displayed only in the case when the PIO has been detected.  
RESULTS 
Pilot’s Subjective Ratings 
The assessment of HQ, PIO and workload tendencies was 
completed through use of subjective opinion scales. The pilot 
was asked to award Cooper-Harper Handling Qualities 
Ratings (HQR) [15], PIO ratings using both the PIO 
Tendency Rating scale (PIOR) [9, 11] and the Adverse Pilot 
Couplings Scale (APCS) [4], and Bedford Workload ratings 
[16]. For simplicity, the PIO tendencies assessment will be 
done only through the APCS in this Section.  
Figure 9 shows the pilot’s subjective ratings 
collected during the trial for the Precision Hover maneuver: 
the black square, the red triangle, and the blue circle indicate 
the HQRs, the Adverse Pilot Coupling, and the Bedford 
Workload ratings, respectively. On the x-axis, the different 
configurations are reported, in terms of rate limits variation 
(see Table 4 for reference) selected in the lateral and 
longitudinal axes during the trial.   
 
Figure 9. Subjective Ratings against Configurations 
tested for Precision Hover  
Going from the baseline configuration C0 to C1 or C3 leads 
to a slight increase of HQR (from 3 to 4, therefore from Level 
1 satisfactory to Level 2 acceptable but unsatisfactory HQs) 
and pilot workload; no PIO was perceived by the pilot 
(APCS=2). Unexpectedly, there is no change in subjective 
ratings between C1 and C3 (meaning that adding a rate limit 
of 5 deg/s in the longitudinal axis did not make a difference 
for the pilot during Precision Hover). It is interesting to notice 
that, when moving from C5 to C6 (i.e. when changing the 
longitudinal rate limit from 3.6 to 1.8 deg/s, while the lateral 
rate limit is 1.8 deg/s for both configurations), there is a 
significant degradation in performance, with a consequent 
increase in all ratings: HQR=10, APCS=7E and WL=8, as 
well as when selecting C7 (configuration in which the rate 
limit is the lowest, 1.25 deg/s in the lateral axis): HQR=10, 
APCS=9E, WL=10, which means severe oscillations forcing 
the pilot to abandon the task. This is an indication of the fact 
that, with the selected configurations within the Precision 
Hover maneuver, the pilot entered PIO situations and crossed 





Figure 10. Subjective Ratings against Configurations 
tested for Lateral Reposition 
Figure 10 shows the pilot’s subjective ratings collected 
during the experiment for the Lateral Reposition maneuver: 
similarly, the black square, the red triangle, and the blue circle 
indicate the HQRs, the Adverse Pilot Coupling, and the 
Bedford Workload ratings, respectively. In this case, the 
degradation of performance, with respect to the baseline 
configuration C0, is already visible for C2 and C3 
(configurations in which the rate limits are 3.6 deg/s in the 
longitudinal axis and 2.5 deg/s in the lateral axis). This is an 
indication that the PVS may be more PIO prone during Lateral 
Reposition than Precision Hover, probably because the 
Lateral Reposition task required a quicker completion leading 
the pilot to use higher rates that were eventually limited. For 
C3 the pilot awarded: HQR=8, APCS=6B, WL=8, very 
similar to the ratings awarded for C4 and C5: HQR=8, 
APCS=6D, WL=8. In both cases pilot adaptation was 
necessary, the main difference between C3 and C4-C5 is that 
an APCS rating of 6B means sustained severe convergent 
oscillations, 6D means divergent severe oscillations. 
Curiously, the Workload rating goes from 8 to 7 from C3 to 
C4 (case in which the longitudinal rate limit was reduced from 
5 to 2.5 deg/s), which is the opposite of what was expected; 
this would usually be due to the pilot getting better in the task 
leading to a lower Workload rating, but in this case it was 
most probably due to pilot’s fatigue leading to a higher 
Workload rating (given that C3, the configuration in which 
the longitudinal rate limit was 5 deg/s, took place towards the 
end of the test campaign, after C4, the one in which it was 2.5 
deg/s). Finally, as expected, C6 is the configuration leading to 
very poor performance within the Lateral Reposition 
maneuver: HQR=9, APCS=7D and WL=8, meaning that the 
pilot encountered severe divergent vehicle oscillations which 
required high level of adaptation and consumed the majority 
of workload.  
Real-time Detection and Objective Evaluation  
In this Subsection, the main results in terms of “objective” 
RT-PAC detection will be reported.  
First of all, Tables 5 and 6 present a summary of the 
subjective ratings and detection percentages of the whole set 
of configurations tested for Precision Hover and Lateral 
Reposition. The columns relative to the lateral and 
longitudinal detection percentages report three values 
representative of the time percentages in which no PIOs, 
moderate PIOs and severe PIOs were detected. There seem to 
be a good correlation between the pilot’s subjective ratings 
and the objective PAC detection percentages.  
 
Table 5. Precision Hover Results 




C0 3 3 2 2 99-1-0 86-8-6 
C1 4 4 2 2 92-8-0 95-5-0 
C3 4 4 2 2 93-7-0 97-3-0 
C5 5 5 4B 3 81-13-6 96-1-3 
C6 10 8 7E 6 65-27-8 62-26-12 
C7 10 10 9E 6 50-27-23 51-21-28 
 
Table 6. Lateral Reposition Results 




C0 4 5 2 2 100-0-0 76-24-0 
C2 6 7 5B 4 70-30-0 73-18-9 
C3 8 8 6B 4 40-55-5 92-8-0 
C4 8 7 6D 4 58-23-19 70-23-7 
C5 8 8 6D 4 52-46-2 72-19-9 
C6 9 8 7D 4 46-34-20 25-60-15 
 
For the sake of simplicity, only the results of one 
configuration for each MTE along one axis will be reported. 
Figures 11, 12, 13 and 14 show the time history of lateral 
control input, roll rate response and swashplate deflection, the 
real-time PAC detection and the PAC chart for the Precision 
Hover maneuver performed with C7. 
A good number of moderate and severe PIOs have 
been detected for C7 through the Precision Hover maneuver, 
precisely for 27% and 23% of the time history, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 11. Time history of Lateral Control Input and 




Figure 12. Time history of Lateral Control Input and 
Swashplate Deflection, C7, PH 
 
Figure 13. RT-PAC Detection, C7, PH 
 
Figure 14. RT-PAC Chart, C7, PH 
Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18 show the time history of lateral 
control input, roll rate response and swashplate deflection, the 
real-time PAC detection and the PAC chart for the Lateral 
Reposition maneuver performed with C4. 
Also in this case a good number of moderate and 
severe PIOs have been detected for C4 through the Lateral 
Reposition maneuver, precisely for 23% and 19% of the time 
history, respectively. 
 
Figure 15. Time history of Lateral Control Input and 
Rotorcraft Rate Response, C4, LR 
 
Figure 16. Time history of Lateral Control Input and 
Swashplate Deflection, C4, LR 
 




Figure 18. RT-PAC Chart 
DISCUSSION 
A pilot-in-the-loop experiment was performed to contribute 
to the development of a real-time PIO detection and warning 
system. To induce the PVS to enter PIO situations, the 
baseline rotorcraft configuration was changed with variations 
of rate limits in the lateral and longitudinal axes. During the 
tests, a BO105-like rotorcraft dynamics model was used, and 
the Precision Hover and Lateral Reposition MTEs were 
chosen. As expected and confirmed by the pilot’s subjective 
ratings, reducing the rate limits leads to a decrease in task 
performance and induces the PVS to be more PIO prone. This 
happened quite clearly within the Precision Hover maneuver 
when moving from C5 to C6, i.e. when changing the 
longitudinal rate limit from 3.6 deg/s to 1.8 deg/s, while the 
lateral rate limit was kept at 1.8 deg/s. During the Lateral 
Reposition maneuver the degradation of performance was 
already visible for configurations less stringent in terms of 
rate limits, indicating that the PVS may be more PIO prone 
during Lateral Reposition than Precision Hover. However, for 
both MTEs, the variations in configuration led to severe 
sustained oscillations which required high level of adaptation 
and consumed the majority of pilot workload.  
Thanks to the current experiment, a certain number 
of data was collected for different rotorcraft configurations, 
i.e. seven different combinations of lateral and longitudinal 
rate limits. Looking at the resulting experiment data, it is clear 
that despite the number of conditions tested, a larger test 
matrix and more data are needed to obtain more meaningful 
results. Increasing the number of test pilots would also allow 
for comparison between pilots and more sensible data. 
As for the warning system, the idea was to keep it as 
simple as possible. One idea to keep the display even simpler, 
could be to use only one circle indicating the presence of the 
PIO and then the arrows indicating the axis where the PIO is 
occurring. But this is probably not the most complete option, 
because it would not present all the possible PIO information 
to the pilot, i.e. all the combinations of severity and axis-
related PIOs at the same time.  
The specific choice of the cues to provide the pilot 
with, will be the subject of further investigation, which needs 
pilot advice and further testing. The main advantage of using 
visual cues with respect to aural cues, is that they easily allow 
the pilot to be alerted to the PIO real-time detection in both 
the lateral and longitudinal axes, by immediately showing the 
PIO severity signal on the head-up display. However, there is 
a risk that the visual cue could be missed. Other options are 
Aural and Haptic cues. The intent is to investigate both of 
these during the project.  
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this paper, an experiment with a highly qualified test pilot 
was performed to investigate the feasibility of a real-time PIO 
detection and warning system, as well as pilot’s adaptation 
and sensitivity to variations in rate limits causing system 
instabilities during the Precision Hover and Lateral 
Reposition MTEs. During the trial, objective PAC 
calculations and subjective pilot ratings were collected for 
seven different tested rotorcraft configurations, i.e. those 
given by a combination of the rate limits variation (5, 3.6, 2.5, 
1.8 and 1.25 deg/s) in the lateral and longitudinal axes. 
Overall, the results show a good correlation between objective 
and subjective evaluations, and that it is possible to detect 
PIOs in real-time and advise the pilot of the same by means 
of visual cues. The RT-PAC algorithm does provide useful 
and timely information as well as providing an indication 
about the PIO severity. Therefore, this approach shows good 
potential for the usefulness of a real-time PIO/RPC detection 
and warning system; nevertheless, since PAC has been 
developed for a specific kind of rotorcraft and with a limited 
number of test pilots, its “universal” adaptation to other kinds 
of rotorcraft and pilots still has to be verified, which means 
that further research and testing will be needed.  
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